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Abstract. The epsilon operator is a term-forming operator which re-
places quantifiers in ordinary predicate logic. The application of this un-
dervalued formalism has been hampered by the absence of well-behaved
proof systems on the one hand, and accessible presentations of its the-
ory on the other. One significant early result for the original axiomatic
proof system for the ε-calculus is the first epsilon theorem, for which
a proof is sketched. The system itself is discussed, also relative to pos-
sible semantic interpretations. The problems facing the development of
proof-theoretically well-behaved systems are outlined.
1 Introduction
A formalism for logical choice operators has long been available in the form of
Hilbert’s epsilon calculus. The epsilon calculus is one of the first formal systems
of first-order predicate logic. It was introduced in 1921 by David Hilbert [10],
who proposed to use it for the formalization and proof theoretical investigation
of mathematical systems. In the epsilon calculus, a term-forming operator ε is
used, the intuitive meaning of which is an indefinite choice function: εxA(x) is
some x which satisfies A(x) if A(x) is satisfied at all, and arbitrary otherwise.
Quantifiers can then be defined, e.g., (∃x)A(x) as A(ǫxA(x)).
The epsilon calculus and proof theoretic methods developed for it, such as
the so-called epsilon substitution method, have mainly been applied to the proof
theoretic analysis of mathematical systems of arithmetic and analysis (especially
in work by Ackermann, Mints, Arai). (See [4] for a survey of the epsilon calculus
and its history.) Despite its long history and manifold uses, the epsilon calculus
as a logical formalism in general is not thoroughly understood, yet its potential
for applications in logic and other areas, especially linguistics and computer
science, has by far not been fully explored.
There are various options for definitions of semantics of the epsilon operator.
The choice of εxA(x) may be extensional (i.e., depend only on the set of x which
satisfy A(x); this definition validates the so-called axiom of ε-extensionality), it
may be intensional (i.e., depend also on A(x) itself; ε-extensionality fails), and it
may be completely indeterministic (i.e., different occurrences of the same ε-term
εxA(x) may select different witnesses for A(x)). The first and third versions
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have been investigated by Blass and Gurevich [6]. These different semantics
result in different expressive power (in particular, over finite models), and are
characterized by different formalizations. Below we present the first two versions
of the semantics of the ε-calculus and sketch completeness results.
The very beginnings of proof theory in the work of Hilbert and his students
consisted in the proof theoretic study of axiom systems for the ε-calculus. One
of the most significant results in this connection are the epsilon theorems. It
plays a role similar to Gentzen’s midsequent theorem in the proof theory of
the sequent calculus: it yields a version of Herbrand’s Theorem. In fact, it was
used to give the first correct proof of Herbrand’s theorem (Hilbert and Bernays
[11]). In a simple formulation, the theorem states that if an existential formula
(∃x)A(x) (not containing ε) is derivable in the epsilon calculus, then there are
terms t1, . . . , tn so that a (Herbrand-) disjunction A(t1)∨ . . .∨A(tn) is derivable
in propositional logic. The proof gives a constructive procedure that, given a
derivation of (∃x)A(x), produces the corresponding Herbrand disjunction. An
analysis of this proof (see [18]) gives a hyper-exponential bound on the length
of the Herbrand disjunction in the number of critical formulas occurring in the
proof. The bound is essentially optimal, since it is known from work by Orevkov
and Statman that the length of Herbrand disjunctions is hyper-exponential in the
length of proofs of the original existential formula (this is the basis for familiar
speed-up theorems of systems with cut over cut-free systems). In section 4 we
prove the first epsilon theorem with identity, along the lines of Bernays’s proof.
A general proof theory of the epsilon calculus requires formal systems that are
more amenable to proof-theoretic investigations than the Hilbert-type axiomatic
systems studied in the Hilbert school. Although some sequent systems for the ep-
silon calculus exist, it is not clear that they are the best possible formulations, nor
have their proof-theoretic properties been investigated in depth. Maehara’s [13]
and Leisenring’s [12] systems were not cut-free complete. Yasuhara [21] studied
a cut-free complete system, but only gave a semantic cut-elimination proof. Sec-
tion 5 surveys these and other systems, and highlights some of the difficulties in
developing a systematic proof theory on the basis of them. Proof-theoretically
suitable formalisms for the ε-calculus are still a desideratum for applications of
the epsilon calculus.
The classical ε-calculus is usually investigated as a proof-theoretic formal-
ism, and no systematic study of the model theory of epsilon calculi other than
Asser’s classic [3] exists. However, Abiteboul and Vianu [2], Blass and Gurevich
[6], and Otto [19] have studied the model theory of choice operators in the con-
text of finite model theory and database query languages. And applications of
choice operators to model definite and indefinite noun phrases in computational
linguistics Meyer Viol [15] and von Heusinger [8,9] have led to the definition of
indexed epsilon calculus by Mints and Sarenac [16].
With a view to applications, it is especially important to develop the seman-
tics and proof theory of epsilon operators in non-classical logics. Of particular
importance in this context is the development of epsilon calculi for intuitionistic
logic, not least because this is the context in which the epsilon calculus can and
has been applied in programming language semantics. Some work has been done
on intuitionistic ε-calculi (e.g., Bell [5], DeVidi [7], Meyer Viol [15], Mints [17]),
but there are still many important open questions. The straightforward exten-
sions of intuitionistic logic by epsilon operators are not conservative and result
in intermediate logics related to Go¨del logic. Meyer Viol [15] has proposed a con-
servative extensions of intuitionistic logic by epsilon operators which warrants
further study.
2 Syntax and Axiomatic Proof Systems
Definition 1. The language of of the elementary calculus L=EC contains the
usual logical symbols (variables, function and predicate symbols, =). A subscript
ε will indicate the presence of the symbol ε, and ∀ the presence of the quantifiers
∀ and ∃. The terms Trm and formulas Frm of Lε∀ are defined as usual, but
simultaneously, to include:
If A is a formula in which x has a free occurrence but no bound occur-
rence, then εxA is a term, and all occurrences of x in it are bound.
If E is an expression (term or formula), then FV(E) is the set of variables which
have free occurrences in E.
When E, E′ are expressions (terms or formulas), we write E ≡ E′ iff E and
E′ are syntactically identical up to a renaming of bound variables. We say that
a term t is free for x in E iff x does not occur free in the scope of an ε-operator
εy or quantifier ∀y, ∃y for any y ∈ FV(t).
If E is an expression and t is a term, we write E[x/t] for the result of sub-
stituting every free occurrence of x in E by t, provided t is free for x in E,
and renaming bound variables in t if necessary. We write E(x) to indicate that
x ∈ FV(E), and E(t) for E[x/t]. We write E{t/u} for the result of replacing
every occurrence of t in E by u.1
Definition 2 (ε-Translation). If E is an expression, define Eε by:
1. Eε = E if E is a variable, a constant symbol, or ⊥.
2. If E = fni (t1, . . . , tn), E
ε = fni (t
ε
1, . . . , t
ε
n).
3. If E = Pni (t1, . . . , tn), E
ε = Pni (t
ε
1, . . . , t
ε
n).
4. If E = ¬A, then Eε = ¬Aε.
5. If E = (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B), (A → B), or (A ↔ B), then Eε = (Aε ∧ Bε),
(Aε ∨Bε), (Aε → Bε), or (Aε ↔ Bε), respectively.
1 Skipping details, (a) we want to replace not just every occurrence of t by u, but every
occurrence of a term t′ ≡ t. (b) t may have an occurrence in E where a variable in t
is bound by a quantifier or ε outside t, and such occurrences shouldn’t be replaced
(they are not subterm occurrences). (c) When replacing t by u, bound variables in
u might have to be renamed to avoid conflicts with the bound variables in E′ and
bound variables in E′ might have to be renamed to avoid free variables in u being
bound.
6. If E = ∃xA(x) or ∀xA(x), then Eε = Aε(εxA(x)ε) or Aε(εx ¬A(x)ε).
7. If E = εxA(x), then E
ε = εxA(x)
ε.
Definition 3. An ε-term p ≡ εxB(x;x1, . . . , xn) is a type of an ε-term εxA(x)
iff
1. p ≡ εxA(x)[x1/t1] . . . [xn/tn] for some terms t1, . . . , tn.
2. FV(p) = {x1, . . . , xn}.
3. x1, . . . , xn are all immediate subterms of p.
4. Each xi has exactly one occurrence in p.
5. The occurrence of xi is left of the occurrence of xj in p if i < j.
We denote the set of types as Typ.
Proposition 4. The type of an epsilon term εxA(x) is unique up to renaming
of bound, and disjoint renaming of free variables.
Definition 5. An ε-term e is nested in an ε-term e′ if e is a proper subterm
of e.
Definition 6. The degree deg(e) of an ε-term e is defined as follows: (1) deg(e) =
1 iff e contains no nested ε-terms. (2) deg(e) = max{deg(e1), . . . , deg(en)}+1 if
e1, . . . , en are all the ε-terms nested in e. For convenience, let deg(t) = 0 if t is
not an ε-term.
Definition 7. An ε-term e is subordinate to an ε-term e′ = εxA(x) if some
e′′ ≡ e occurs in e′ and x ∈ FV(e′′).
Note that if e is subordinate to e′ it is not a subterm of e′, because x is free
in e and so the occurrence of e (really, of the variant e′′) in e′ is in the scope
of εx.
2
Definition 8. The rank rk(e) of an ε-term e is defined as follows: (1) rk(e) = 1
iff e contains no subordinate ε-terms. (2) rk(e) = max{rk(e1), . . . , rk(en)}+ 1 if
e1, . . . , en are all the ε-terms subordinate to e.
Proposition 9. If p is the type of e, then rk(p) = rk(e).
2.1 Axioms and Proofs
Definition 10. The axioms of the elementary calculus EC are
A for any tautology A (Taut)
and its only rule of inference is
A A→ B
A
MP
2 One might think that replacing e in εxA(x) by a new variable y would result in an
ε-term εxA
′(y) so that e′ ≡ εx A
′(y)[y/e]. But (a) εx A
′(y) is not in general a term,
since it is not guaranteed that x is free in A′(y) and (b) e is not free for y in εxA
′(y).
For EC=, we add
t = t for any term t (=1)
t = u→ (A[x/t]↔ A[x/u]). (=2)
The axioms and rules of the (intensional) ε-calculus ECε (EC
=
ε ) are those of EC
(EC=) plus the critical formulas
A(t)→ A(εxA(x)). (crit)
The axioms and rules of the extensional ε-calculus ECextε are those of EC
=
ε plus
(∀x(A(x)↔ B(x)))ε → εxA(x) = εxB(x), (ext)
that is,
A(εx ¬(A(x)↔ B(x)))↔ B(εx ¬(A(x)↔ B(x)))→ εxA(x) = εxB(x)
The axioms and rules of EC∀, ECε∀, EC
ext
ε∀ are those of EC, ECε, EC
ext
ε , respec-
tively, together with the axioms
A(t)→ ∃xA(x) (Ax∃)
∀xA(x)→ A(t) (Ax∀)
and the rules
A(x)→ B
∃xA(x)→ B
R∃
B → A(x)
B → ∀xA(x)
R∀
Applications of these rules must satisfy the eigenvariable condition, viz., the
variable x must not appear in the conclusion or anywhere below it in the proof.
Definition 11. If Γ is a set of formulas, a proof of A from Γ in ECextε∀ is a
sequence π of formulas A1, . . . , An = A where for each i ≤ n, Ai ∈ Γ , Ai is an
instance of an axiom, or follows from formulas Aj (j < i) by a rule of inference.
If π only uses the axioms and rules of EC, ECε, EC
ext
ε , etc., then it is a proof
of A from Γ in EC, ECε, EC
ext
ε , etc., and we write Γ ⊢
π A, Γ ⊢πε A, Γ ⊢
π
εext A,
etc.
We say that A is provable from Γ in EC, etc. (Γ ⊢ A, etc.), if there is a proof
of A from Γ in EC, etc.
Note that our definition of proof, because of its use of ≡, includes a tacit
rule for renaming bound variables. Note also that substitution into members
of Γ is not permitted. However, we can simulate a provability relation in which
substitution into members of Γ is allowed by considering Γ inst, the set of all
substitution instances of members of Γ . If Γ is a set of sentences, then Γ inst = Γ .
Proposition 12. If π = A1, . . . , An ≡ A is a proof of A from Γ and x /∈ FV(Γ )
is not an eigenvariable in π, then π[x/t] = A1[x/t], . . . , An[x/t] is a proof of
A[x/t] from Γ inst.
Lemma 13. If π is a proof of B from Γ ∪ {A}, then there is a proof π[A] of
A→ B from Γ , provided A contains no eigenvariables of π free.
Proof. By induction on the length of π, as in the classical case.
Theorem 14 (Deduction Theorem). If Σ ∪ {A} is a set of sentences, Σ ⊢
A→ B iff Σ ∪ {A} ⊢ B.
Corollary 15. If Σ ∪ {A} is a set of sentences, Σ ⊢ A iff Σ ∪ {¬A} ⊢ ⊥.
Lemma 16 (ε-Embedding Lemma). If Γ ⊢πε∀ A, then there is a proof π
ε so
that Γ εinst ⊢π
ε
ε A
ε
Proof. By induction, see [18].
3 Semantics and Completeness
3.1 Semantics for ECext
ε
Definition 17. A structure M = 〈|M| , (·)M〉 consists of a nonempty domain |M| 6=
∅ and a mapping (·)M on function and predicate symbols where (f0i )
M ∈ |M|,
(fni )
M ∈ |M||M|
n
, and (Pni )
M ⊆ |M|n.
Definition 18. An extensional choice function Φ on M is a function Φ : ℘(|M|)→
|M| where Φ(X) ∈ X whenever X 6= ∅.
Note that Φ is total on ℘(|M|), and so Φ(∅) ∈ |M|.
Definition 19. An assignment s on M is a function s : Var→ |M|.
If x ∈ Var and m ∈ |M|, s[x/m] is the assignment defined by
s[x/m](y) =
{
m if y = x
s(y) otherwise
Definition 20. The value valM,Φ,s(t) of a term and the satisfaction relation
M, Φ, s |= A are defined as follows:
1. valM,Φ,s(x) = s(x)
2. M, Φ, s |= ⊤ and M, Φ, s 6|= ⊥
3. valM,Φ,s(f
n
i (t1, . . . , tn)) = (f
n
i )
M(valM,Φ,s(t1), . . . , valM,Φ,s(tn))
4. M, Φ, s |= t1 = tn iff valM,Φ,s(t1) = valM,Φ,s(t2)
5. M, Φ, s |= Pni (t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈valM,Φ,s(t1), . . . , valM,Φ,s(tn)〉 ∈ (P
n
i )
M
6. valM,Φ,s(εxA(x)) = Φ(valM,Φ,s(A(x))) where
valM,Φ,s(A(x)) = {m ∈ |M| : M, Φ, s[x/m] |= A(x)}
7. M, Φ, s |= ∃xA(x) iff for some m ∈ |M|, M, Φ, s[x/m] |= A(x)
8. M, Φ, s |= ∀xA(x) iff for all m ∈ |M|, M, Φ, s[x/m] |= A(x)
Proposition 21. If s(x) = s′(x) for all x /∈ FV(t)∪FV(A), then valM,Φ,s(t) =
valM,Φ,s′(t) and M, Φ, s |= A iff M, Φ, s′ |= A.
Proposition 22 (Substitution Lemma). Ifm = valM,Φ,s(u), then valM,Φ,s(t(u)) =
valM,Φ,s[x/m](t(x)) and M, Φ, s |= A(u) iff M, Φ, s[x/m] |= A(x)
Definition 23. 1. A is locally true in M w.r.t. Φ and s iff M, Φ, s |= A.
2. A is true in M with respect to Φ, M, Φ |= A, iff for all s on M: M, Φ, s |= A.
3. A is generically true in M with respect to s, M, s |=g A, iff for all choice
functions Φ on M: M, Φ, s |= A.
4. A is generically valid in M, M |= A, if for all choice functions Φ and assign-
ments s on M: M, Φ, s |= A.
Definition 24. Let Γ ∪ {A} be a set of formulas.
1. A is a local consequence of Γ , Γ |=l A, iff for all M, Φ, and s:
if M, Φ, s |= Γ then M, Φ, s |= A.
2. A is a truth consequence of Γ , Γ |= A, iff for all M, Φ:
if M, Φ |= Γ then M, Φ |= A.
3. A is a generic consequence of Γ , Γ |=g A, iff for all M and s:
if M, s |=g Γ then M |= A.
4. A is a generic validity consequence of Γ , Γ |=v A, iff for all M:
if M |=v Γ then M |= A.
Proposition 25. If Σ ∪ {A} is a set of sentences, Σ |=l A iff Σ |= A
Proposition 26. If Σ ∪ {A,B} is a set of sentences, Σ ∪ {A} |= B iff Σ |=
A→ B.
Corollary 27. If Σ ∪ {A} is a set of sentences, Σ |= A iff for no M, Φ, M |=
Σ ∪ {¬A}
3.2 Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 28. If Γ ⊢ε A, then Γ |=
l A.
Proof. Suppose Γ, Φ, s |= Γ . We show by induction on the length n of a proof π
that M, Φ, s′ |= A for all s′ which agree with s on FV(Γ ). We may assume that
no eigenvariable x of π is in FV(Γ ) (if it is, let y /∈ FV(π) and not occurring
in π; consider π[x/y] instead of π).
If n = 0 there’s nothing to prove. Otherwise, we distinguish cases according
to the last line An in π. The only interesting case is when An is a critical formula,
i.e., An ≡ A(t)→ A(εxA(x)). Then either M, Φ, s |= A(t) or not (in which case
there’s nothing to prove). If yes, M, Φ, s[x/m] |= A(x) for m = valM,Φ,s(t), and
so Y = valM,Φ,s(A(x)) 6= ∅. Consequently, Φ(Y ) ∈ Y , and hence M, Φ, s |=
A(εxA(x)).
Lemma 29. If Γ is a set of sentences and Γ 6⊢ε ⊥, then there are M, Φ so that
M, Φ |= Γ .
Theorem 30 (Completeness). If Γ ∪ {A} are sentences and Γ |= A, then
Γ ⊢εext A.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6|= A. Then for some M, Φ we have M, Φ |= Γ but M, Φ 6|= A.
Hence M, Φ |= Γ ∪ {¬A}. By the Lemma, Γ ∪ {¬A} ⊢ε ⊥. By Corollary 15,
Γ ⊢ε A.
The proof of the Lemma comes in several stages. We have to show that if Γ is
consistent, we can construct M, Φ, and s so that M, Φ, s |= Γ . Since FV(Γ ) = ∅,
we then have M, Φ |= Γ .
Lemma 31. If Γ 6⊢ε ⊥, there is Γ ∗ ⊇ Γ with (1) Γ ∗ 6⊢ε ⊥ and (2) for all
formulas A, either A ∈ Γ ∗ or ¬A ∈ Γ ∗.
Proof. Let A1, A2, . . . be an enumeration of Frmε. Define Γ0 = Γ and
Γn+1 =
{
Γn ∪ {An} if Γn ∪ {An} 6⊢ε ⊥
Γn ∪ {¬An} if Γn ∪ {¬An} 6⊢ε ⊥ otherwise
Let Γ ∗ =
⋃
n≥0 Γn. Obviously, Γ ⊆ Γ
∗. For (1), observe that if Γ ∗ ⊢πε ⊥, then π
contains only finitely many formulas from Γ ∗, so for some n, Γn ⊢
π
ε ⊥. But Γn
is consistent by definition.
To verify (2), we have to show that for each n, either Γn ∪ {An} 6⊢ε ⊥ or
Γn ∪ {¬A} 6⊢ε ⊥. For n = 0, this is the assumption of the lemma. So suppose
the claim holds for n− 1. Suppose Γn ∪ {A} ⊢πε ⊥ and Γn ∪ {¬A} ⊢
π′
ε ⊥. Then
by the Deduction Theorem, we have Γn ⊢
π[A]
A → ⊥ and Γn ⊢
π′[A′]
¬ A→ ⊥. Since
(A → ⊥) → ((¬A → ⊥) → ⊥) is a tautology, we have Γn ⊢ε ⊥, contradicting
the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 32. If Γ ∗ ⊢ε B, then B ∈ Γ
∗.
Proof. If not, then ¬B ∈ Γ ∗ by maximality, so Γ ∗ would be inconsistent.
Definition 33. Let ≈ be the relation on Trmε defined by
t ≈ u iff t = u ∈ Γ ∗
It is easily seen that ≈ is an equivalence relation. Let t˜ = {u : u ≈ t} and
T˜rm = {t˜ : t ∈ Trm}.
Definition 34. A set T ∈ T˜rm is represented by A(x) if T = {t˜ : A(t) ∈ Γ ∗}.
Let Φ0 be a fixed choice function on T˜rm, and define
Φ(T ) =
{
˜εxA(x) if T is represented by A(x)
Φ0(T ) otherwise.
Proposition 35. Φ is a well-defined choice function on T˜rm.
Proof. Use (ext) for well-definedness and (crit) for choice function.
Now letM = 〈T˜rm, (·)M〉 with cM = c˜, (Pni )
M = {〈t˜1, . . . , t˜1〉 : Pni (t1, . . . , tn)},
and let s(x) = s˜.
Proposition 36. M, Φ, s |= Γ ∗.
Proof. We show that valM,Φ,s(t) = t˜ andM, Φ, s |= A iff A ∈ Γ ∗ by simultaneous
induction on the complexity of t and A.
If t = c is a constant, the claim holds by definition of (·)M. If A = ⊥ or = ⊤,
the claim holds by Lemma 32.
If A ≡ Pn(t1, . . . , tn), then by induction hypothesis, valM,Φ,s(t)i = t˜i. By
definition of (·)M, 〈t˜1, . . . , t˜n〉 ∈ (P
n
i )(t1, . . . , tn) iff P
n
i (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Γ
∗.
If A ≡ ¬B, (B ∧ C), (B ∨ C), (B → C), (B ↔ C), the claim follows
immediately from the induction hypothesis and the definition of |= and the
closure properties of Γ ∗. For instance, M, Φ, s |= (B ∧ C) iff M, Φ, s |= B and
M, Φ, s |= C. By induction hypothesis, this is the case iff B ∈ Γ ∗ and C ∈ Γ ∗.
But sinceB,C ⊢ε B∧C andB∧C ⊢ε B and ⊢ε C, this is the case iff (B∧C) ∈ Γ
∗.
Remaining cases: Exercise.
If t ≡ εxA(x), then valM,Φ,s(t) = Φ(valM,Φ,s(A(x))). Since valM,Φ,s(A(x)) is
represented by A(x) by induction hypothesis, we have valM,Φ,s(t) = ˜εxA(x) by
definition of Φ.
3.3 Semantics for ECε
In order to give a complete semantics for ECε, i.e., for the calculus without
the extensionality axiom (ext), it is necessary to change the notion of choice
function so that two ε-terms εxA(x) and εxB(x) may be assigned different
representatives even when M, Φ, s |= ∀x(A(x)↔ B(x)), since then the negation
of (ext) is consistent in the resulting calculus. The idea is to add the ε-term
itself as an additional argument to the choice function. However, in order for
this semantics to be sound for the calculus—specifically, in order for (=2) to be
valid—we have to use not ε-terms but ε-types.
Definition 37. An intensional choice operator is a mapping Ψ : Typ×|M|<ω →
|M|℘(|M|) such that for every type p = εxA(x; y1, . . . , yn) is a type, and m1,
. . . , mn ∈ |M|, Ψ(p,m1, . . . ,mn) is a choice function.
Definition 38. If M is a structure, Ψ an intensional choice operator, and s
an assignment, valM,Ψ,s(t) and M, Ψ, s |= A is defined as before, except (6) in
Definition 20 is replaced by:
(6′) valM,Ψ,s(εxA(x)) = Ψ(p,m1, . . . ,mn)(valM,Φ,s(A(x))) where
(a) p = εxA
′(x;x1, . . . , xn) is the type of εxA(x),
(b) t1, . . . , tn are the subterms corresponding to x1, . . . , xn, i.e., εxA(x) ≡
εxA
′(x; t1, . . . , tn),
(c) mi = valM,Ψ,s(t)1, and
(d) valM,Φ,s(A(x)) = {m ∈ |M| : M, Ψ, s[x/m] |= A(x)}
The soundness and completeness proofs generalize to ECε, EC
=
ε , and ECε∀.
4 The First Epsilon Theorem
4.1 The Case Without Identity
Definition 39. An ε-term e is critical in π if A(t)→ A(e) is one of the critical
formulas in π. The rank rk(π) of a proof π is the maximal rank of its critical
ε-terms. The r-degree deg(π, r) of π is the maximum degree of its critical ε-terms
of rank r. The r-order o(π, r) of π is the number of different (up to renaming of
bound variables) critical ε-terms of rank r.
Lemma 40. If e = εxA(x), εy B(y) are critical in π, rk(e) = rk(π), and B
∗ ≡
B(u)→ B(εy B(y)) is a critical formula in π. Then, if e is a subterm of B∗, it
is a subterm of B(y) or a subterm of u.
Proof. Suppose not. Since e is a subterm ofB∗, we haveB(y) ≡ B′(εxA′(x, y), y)
and either e ≡ εxA′(x, u) or e ≡ εxA′(x, εy B(y)). In each case, we see that
εxA
′(x, y) and e have the same rank, since the latter is an instance of the former
(and so have the same type). On the other hand, in either case, εy B(y) would
be
εy B
′(εxA
′(x, y), y)
and so would have a higher rank than εxA
′(x, y) as that ε-term is subordinate
to it. This contradicts rk(e) = rk(π).
Lemma 41. Let e, B∗ be as in the lemma, and t be any term. Then
1. If e is not a subterm of B(y), B∗{e/t} ≡ B(u′)→ B(εy B(y)).
2. If e is a subterm of B(y), i.e., B(y) ≡ B′(e, y), B∗{e/t} ≡ B′(t, u′) →
B′(t, εy B
′(t, y)).
Lemma 42. If ⊢πε E and E does not contain ε, then there is a proof π
′ such
that ⊢π
′
ε E and rk(π
′) ≤ rk(pi) = r and o(π′, r) < o(π, r).
Proof. Let e be an ε-term critical in π and let A(t1)→ A(e), dots, A(tn)→ A(e)
be all its critical formulas in π.
Consider π{e/t}i, i.e., π with e replaced by ti throughout. Each critical for-
mula belonging to e now is of the form A(t′j)→ A(ti), since e obviously cannot
be a subterm of A(x) (if it were, e would be a subterm of εxA(x), i.e., of itself!).
Let πˆi be the sequence of tautologies A(ti)→ (A(t′j)→ A(ti)) for i = 1, . . . , n,
followed by π{e/t}i. Each one of the formulas A(t′j)→ A(ti) follows from one of
these by (MP) from A(ti). Hence, A(ti) ⊢
πˆi
ε E. Let πi = πˆi[Ai] as in Lemma 13.
We have ⊢πiε Ai → E.
The ε-term e is not critical in πi: Its original critical formulas are replaced by
A(ti)→ (A(t′j)→ A(ti)), which are tautologies. By (1) of the preceding Lemma,
no critical ε-term of rank r was changed at all. By (2) of the preceding Lemma,
no critical ε-term of rank < r was replaced by a critical ε-term of rank ≥ r.
Hence, o(πi, r) = o(π) − 1.
Let π′′ be the sequence of tautologies ¬
∨n
i=1 A(ti)→ (A(ti)→ A(e)) followed
by π. Then
∨n
i=1 A(ti) ⊢
π′′
E , e is not critical in π
′′, and otherwise π and π′′
have the same critical formulas. The same goes for π′′[¬
∨
A(ti)], a proof of
¬
∨
A(ti)→ E.
We now obtain π′ as the πi, i = 1, . . . , n, followed by π[¬
∨n
i=1 A(ti)], followed
by the tautology
(¬
∨
A(ti)→ E)→ (A(t1)→ E)→ · · · → (A(tn)→ E)→ E) . . . )
from which E follows by n+ 1 applications of (MP).
Theorem 43 (First Epsilon Theorem for ECε). If E is a formula not con-
taining any ε-terms and ⊢ε E, then ⊢ε E.
Proof. By induction on o(π, r), we have: if ⊢πε E, then there is a proof π
∗ of
E with rk(π−) < r. By induction on rk(()π) we have a proof π∗∗ of E with
rk(π∗∗) = 0, i.e., without critical formulas at all.
Corollary 44 (Extended First ε-Theorem). If ⊢ε E(e1, . . . , en), then ⊢∨
m
i=1
E(tj1, . . . , t
j
n) for some terms tj (in EC).
Proof. If E contains ε-terms, say, E is E(e1, . . . , en), then replacement of ε-
terms in the construction of πi may change E—but of course only the ε-terms
appearing as subterms in it. In each step we obtain not a proof of E but of some
disjunction of instances E(e′1, . . . , e
′
n). For details, see [18].
4.2 The Case with Identity
In the presence of the identity (=) predicate in the language, things get a bit
more complicated. The reason is that instances of the (=2) axiom schema,
t = u→ (A(t)→ A(u))
may also contain ε-terms, and the replacement of an ε-term e by a term ti in
the construction of πi may result in a formula which no longer is an instance of
(=2). For instance, suppose that t is a subterm of e = e
′(t) and A(t) is of the
form A′(e′(t)). Then the original axiom is
t = u→ (A′(e′(t))→ A′(e′(u))
which after replacing e = e′(t) by ti turns into
t = u→ (A′(ti)→ A
′(e′(u)).
So this must be avoided. In order to do this, we first observe that just as in
the case of the predicate calculus, the instances of (=2) can be derived from
restricted instances. In the case of the predicate calculus, the restricted axioms
are
t = u→ (Pn(s1, . . . , t, . . . sn)→ P
n(s1, . . . , u, . . . , sn) (=
′
2)
t = u→ fn(s1, . . . , t, . . . , sn) = f
n(s1, . . . , u, . . . , sn) (=
′′
2 )
to which we have to add the ε-identity axiom schema:
t = u→ εxA(x; s1, . . . , t, . . . sn) = εxA(x; s1, . . . , u, . . . sn) (=ε)
where εxA(x;x1, . . . , xn) is an ε-type.
Proposition 45. Every instance of (=2) can be derived from (=
′
2), (=
′′
2), and
(=ε).
Proof. By induction.
Now replacing every occurrence of e in an instance of (=′2) or (=
′′
2)—where
e obviously can only occur inside one of the terms t, u, s1, . . . , sn—results in a
(different) instance of (=′2) or (=
′′
2 ). The same is true of (=ε), provided that the
e is neither εxA(x; s1, . . . , t, . . . sn) nor εxA(x; s1, . . . , u, . . . sn). This would be
guaranteed if the type of e is not εxA(x;x1, . . . , xn), in particular, if the rank of
e is higher than the rank of εxA(x;x1, . . . , xn). Moreover, the result of replacing
e by ti in any such instance of (=ε) results in an instance of (=ε) which belongs
to the same ε-type. Thus, in order for the proof of the first ε-theorem to work
also when = and axioms (=1), (=
′
2), (=
′′
2 ), and (=ε) are present, it suffices to
show that the instances of (=ε) with ε-terms of rank rk(π) can be removed. Call
an ε-term e special in π, if π contains an occurrence of t = u → e′ = e as an
instance of (=ε).
Theorem 46. If ⊢πε= E, then there is a proof π
= so that ⊢π
=
ε= E, rk(π
=) =
rk(pi), and the rank of the special ε-terms in π= has rank < rk(π).
Proof. The basic idea is simple: Suppose t = u→ e′ = e is an instance of (=ε),
with e′ ≡ εxA(x; s1, . . . , t, . . . sn) and e ≡ εxA(x; s1, . . . , u, . . . sn). Replace e
everywhere in the proof by e′. Then the instance of (=ε) under consideration is
removed, since it is now provable from e′ = e′. This potentially interferes with
critical formulas belonging to e, but this can also be fixed: we just have to show
that by a judicious choice of e it can be done in such a way that the other (=ε)
axioms are still of the required form.
Let p = εxA(x;x1, . . . , xn) be an ε-type of rank rk(π), and let e1, . . . , el be
all the ε-terms of type p which have a corresponding instance of (=ε) in π. Let
Ti be the set of all immediate subterms of e1, . . . , el, in the same position as
xi, i.e., the smallest set of terms so that if ei ≡ εxA(x; t1, . . . , tn), then ti ∈ T .
Now let let T ∗ be all instances of p with terms from Ti substituted for the xi.
Obviously, T and thus T ∗ are finite (up to renaming of bound variables). Pick
a strict order ≺ on T which respects degree, i.e., if deg(t) < deg(u) then t ≺ u.
Extend ≺ to T ∗ by
εxA(x; t1, . . . , tn) ≺ εxA(x; t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n)
iff
1. max{deg(ti) : i = 1, . . . , n} < max{deg(ti) : i = 1, . . . , n} or
2. max{deg(ti) : i = 1, . . . , n} = max{deg(ti) : i = 1, . . . , n} and
(a) ti ≡ t′i for i = 1, . . . , k.
(b) tk+1 ≺ t′k+1
Lemma 47. Suppose ⊢πε= E, e a special ε-term in π with rk(e) = rk(π), deg(e)
maximal among the special ε-terms of rank rk(π), and e maximal with respect to
≺ defined above. Let t = u → e′ = e be an instance of (=ε) in π. Then there is
a proof π′, ⊢π
′
ε= E such that
1. rk(π′) = rk(π)
2. π′ does not contain t = u→ e′ = e as an axiom
3. Every special ε-term e′′ of π′ with the same type as e is so that e′′ ≺ e.
Proof. Let π0 = π{e/e
′} and suppose t′ = u′ → e′′′ = e′′ is an (=ε) axiom in π.
If rk(e′′) < rk(e), then the replacement of e by e′ can only change subterms
of e′′ and e′′′. In this case, the uniform replacement results in another instance
of (=ε) with ε-terms of the same ε-type, and hence of the same rank < rk(π),
as the original.
If rk(e′′) = rk(e) but has a different type than e, then this axiom is unchanged
in π0: Neither e
′′ nor e′′′ can be ≡ e, because they have different ε-types, and
neither e′′ nor e′′′ (nor t′ or u′, which are subterms of e′′, e′′′) can contain e as
a subterm, since then e wouldn’t be degree-maximal among the special ε-terms
of π of rank rk(π).
If the type of e′′, e′′′ is the same as that of e, e cannot be a proper subterm of
e′′ or e′′′, since otherwise e′′ or e′′′ would again be a special ε-term of rank rk(π)
but of higher degree than e. So either e ≡ e′′ or e ≡ e′′′, without loss of generality
suppose e ≡ e′′. Then the (=ε) axiom in question has the form
t′ = u′ → εxA(x; s1, . . . t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . u
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′≡e
and with e replaced by e′:
t′ = u′ → εxA(x; s1, . . . t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
which is no longer an instance of (=ε), but can be proved from new instances
of (=ε). We have to distinguish two cases according to whether the indicated
position of t and t′ in e′, e′′′ is the same or not. In the first case, u ≡ u′, and the
new formula
t′ = u→ εxA(x; s1, . . . t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
can be proved from t = u together with
t′ = t→ εxA(x; s1, . . . t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
(=ε)
t = u→ (t′ = u→ t′ = t) (=′2)
Since e′ and e′′′ already occurred in π, by assumption e′, e′′′ ≺ e.
In the second case, the original formulas read, with terms indicated:
t = u→ εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . , u
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . u, . . . , u
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e
t′ = u′ → εxA(x; s1, . . . u, . . . , t
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . u, . . . , u
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′≡e
and with e replaced by e′ the latter becomes:
t′ = u′ → εxA(x; s1, . . . u, . . . , t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . , u
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
This new formula is provable from t = u together with
u = t→ εxA(x; s1, . . . u, . . . , t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . , t
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′′
t′ = u′ → εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . , t
′, . . . sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′′′′
= εxA(x; s1, . . . t, . . . , u
′, . . . , sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
e′
and some instances of (=′2). Hence, π
′ contains a (possibly new) special ε-
term e′′′′. However, e′′′′ ≺ e.
In the special case where e = e′′ and e′ = e′′′, i.e., the instance of (=ε) we
started with, then replacing e by e′ results in t = u→ e′ = e′, which is provable
from e′ = e′, an instance of (=1).
Let π1 be π0 with the necessary new instances of (=ε), added. The instances
of (=ε) in π1 satisfy the properties required in the statement of the lemma.
However, the results of replacing e by e′ may have impacted some of the crit-
ical formulas in the original proof. For a critical formula to which e ≡ εxA(x, u)
belongs is of the form
A(t′, u)→ A(εxA(x, u), u) (1)
which after replacing e by e′ becomes
A(t′′, u)→ A(εxA(x, t), u) (2)
which is no longer a critical formula. This formula, however, can be derived from
t = u together with
A(t′′, u)→ A(εxA(x, t), u) (ε)
t = u→ (A(εxA(x, t), t)→ A(εxA(x, t), u)) (=2)
u = t→ (A(t′′, u)→ A(t′′, t)) (=2)
Let π2 be π1 plus these derivations of (2) with the instances of (=2) themselves
proved from (=′2) and (=ε). The rank of the new critical formulas is the same,
so the rank of π2 is the same as that of π. The new instances of (=ε) required
for the derivation of the last two formulas only contain ε-terms of lower rank
that that of e, as can be verified.
π2 is thus a proof of E from t = u which satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
From it, we obtain a proof π2[t = u] of t = u → E by the deduction theorem.
On the other hand, the instance t = u → e′ = e under consideration can also
be proved trivially from t 6= u. The proof π[t 6= u] thus is also a proof, this time
of t 6= u → E, which satisfies the conditions of the lemma. We obtain π′ by
combining the two proofs.
Theorem 48 (First Epsilon Theorem for EC=ε ). If E is a formula not
containing any ε-terms and ⊢ε= E, then ⊢= E (in EC
=).
Proof. By repeated application of the Lemma, every instance of (=ε) involving
ε-terms of a given type p can be eliminated from π. The Theorem follows by
induction on the number of different types of special ε-terms of rank rk(π) in π.
5 Proof Theory of the Epsilon Calculus
5.1 Sequent Calculi
Leisenring [12] presented a one-sided sequent calculus for the ε-calculus. It op-
erates on sets of formulas (sequents); proofs are trees of sets of formulas each
of which is either an axiom (at a leaf of the tree) or follows from the sets of
formulas above it by an inference rule. Axioms are A,¬A. The rules are given
below:
Γ,A Γ,B
Γ,A ∧B
∧R
Γ,¬A,¬B
Γ,¬(A ∧B)
∧L
Γ,A
Γ,¬¬A
¬¬
Γ,A,B
Γ,A ∨B
∨R
Γ,¬A Γ,¬B
Γ,¬(A ∨B)
∨L
Π,A Λ,¬A
Π,Λ
cut
Γ,A(t)
Γ, ∃xA(x)
∃R
Γ,¬A(εxA(x))
Γ,¬∃xA(x)
∃L
Γ,A
Γ,A,B
w
Γ,A(εx ¬A(x))
Γ, ∀xA(x)
∀R
Γ,¬A(t)
Γ,¬∀xA(x)
∀L
In contrast to classical sequent systems, there are no eigenvariable conditions!
It is complete, since proofs can easily be translated into derivations in ECε;
in particular it derives critical formulas:
¬A(t), A(t)
¬A(t), ∃xA(x)
∃R
¬A(εxA(x)), A(εx A(x))
¬∃xA(x) , A(εxA(x))
∃L
¬A(t), A(εx A(x))
cut
This sequent, however, has no cut-free proof.
Maehara [13] instead proposed to simply add axioms corresponding to to
critical formulas and leave out quantifier rules. Hence, its axioms are ¬A,A and
¬A(t), A(εx A(x)). It is complete, since the additional axioms allow derivation of
critical formulas. However, it is also not cut-free complete. Converses of critical
formulas are derivable using cut:
¬¬A(t) ,¬A(εx ¬A(x)) ¬A(t) , A(t)
¬A(εx ¬A(x)), A(t)
cut
But these obviously have no cut-free proof. Furthermore, addition of these con-
verses as axioms will not result in a cut-free complete system, either. Consider
the example given by Wessels: Let e = εx ¬(A(x) ∨B(x)).
¬¬(A(t) ∨B(t)) ,¬(A(e) ∨B(e))
.... cut
¬(A(e) ∨B(e)) , A(t) ∨B(t)
¬A(e), A(e)
¬A(e), A(e) ∨B(e)
∨R
¬A(εx ¬(A(x) ∨B(x))), A(t) ∨B(t)
cut
Wessels [20] proposed to add instead the following rule to the propositional
one-sided sequent calculus:
Γ,∆(z),¬A(z) Γ,A(t)
Γ,∆(εxA(x))
ε0
Here, ∆(z) must be not empty, and z may not occur in the lower sequent. This
system also derives critical formulas, and so is complete:
A(z),¬A(z)
¬A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, A(a)︸︷︷︸
∆
,¬A(z)
w
¬A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, A(t)
¬A(t), A(εx A(x))
ε0
The rule ε0 is sound.3
Wessels offered a cut-elimination proof for her system. However, the proof
relied on a false lemma to which Maehara gave a counterexample.
Wessels’ Lemma. If ⊢ Γ,∆(εxA(x)) then ⊢ Γ,∆(z),¬A(z).
Let A(x) = P (x, εy Q(εu P (u, y))), ∆(z) = Q(z), and Γ = ¬Q(εxB(x,w)).
Then
¬Q(εx P (x,w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, Q(εx P (x, εy Q(εu P (u, y))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆(εx A(x))
3 Suppose the upper sequents are valid but the lower sequent is not, i.e., for some
M, Ψ, s, M 6|= Γ,∆(εxA(x)). In particular, M, Ψ, s 6|= Γ . Hence, M, Ψ, s |= A(t),
i.e., M, Ψ, s |= A′(t, t1, . . . , tn), as the right premise is valid. So valM,Ψ,s(t) ∈
valM,Ψ,s(A(x)). Now let s(z) = valM,Ψ,s(εx A
′(x, t1, . . . , tn)). Then M, Ψ, s |= A(z)
and so M, Ψ, s 6|= ¬A(z). Since the left premise is valid, M, Ψ, s |= ∆(z). But also
M, Ψ, s 6|= ∆(z) since M, Ψ, s 6|= ∆(εxA(x)).
is derivable, since it is of the form ¬B(w), B(εy B(y)). However, the correspond-
ing sequent in the consequent of the lemma,
¬Q(εx P (x,w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, Q(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆(z)
,¬P (z, εyQ(εu P (u, y)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬A(z)
is not derivable, because not valid.4
Mints (in a review of Wessels’ paper) proposed the following rule instead:
Γ,∆(εxA(x)),¬A(εx A(x)) Γ,A(t)
Γ,∆(εxA(x))
ε1
It, too, derives all critical formulas:
A(εxA(x)),¬A(εx A(x))
¬A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, A(εxA(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
,¬A(εx A(x))
w
¬A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
, A(t)
¬A(t), A(εx A(x))
ε1
The system was developed in detail by Yasuhara [21]. The Mints-Yasuhara sys-
tem is cut-free complete. However, it is not known if the sequent has a cut-
elimination theorem that transforms a proof with cuts successively into one
without cuts. Both Gentzen’s and Tait’s approach to cut-elimination do not
seem to work. In a Gentzen-style proof, the main induction is on on cut length,
i.e., the height of the proof tree above an uppermost cut. In the induction step,
a cut is permuted upward to reduce the cut length. For instance, we replace the
subproof proof ending in a cut
.... π
Π, A
.... π
′
¬A,Λ,B(t)
¬A ,Λ, ∃xB(x)
∃R
Π,Λ, ∃xB(x)
cut
by
.... π
Π, A
.... π
′
¬A ,Λ,B(t)
Π,Λ,B(t)
cut
Π,Λ, ∃xB(x)
∃R
To permute a cut across the ε1 rule:
.... π
Π, A
.... π
′
¬A,Γ,∆(εxB(x)),¬B(εx B(x))
.... π
′′
Γ,B(t)
¬A ,Γ,∆(εxB(x))
ε1
Π,Γ,∆(εxB(x))
cut
4 Let |M| = {1, 2}, QM = {1}, PM = {〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 2〉}, s(z) = s(w) = 2. Since 〈1, 2〉 ∈
PM, we can choose Ψ so that valM,Ψ,s(εx P (x, 2)) = 1. So M, Ψ, s 6|= ¬Q(εx P (x,w)).
Also, M, Ψ, s 6|= Q(z). As valM,Ψ,s(εu P (u, 2)) = 1 and 1 ∈ Q
M, we can also fix Ψ so
that valM,Ψ,s(εy Q(εu P (u, y))) = 2. But then M, Ψ, s 6|= ¬P (z, εy Q(εu P (u, y))).)
one might try to replace the proof tree with
.... π
Π, A
.... π
′
¬A ,Γ,∆(εxB(x)),¬B(εx B(x))
Π,Γ,∆(εxB(x)),¬B(εx B(x))
cut
.... π
′′
Γ,B(t)
Γ,∆(εxB(x))
ε1
However, here the condition on ε1 is violated if ¬A is in ∆.
In a Tait-style cut elimination proof, the main induction is on cut rank, i.e.,
complexity of the cut formula. In the induction step, the complexity of the cut
formula is reduced. For instance, if a subproof ends in a cut
.... π
Π, ¬(A ∧B)
.... π
′
Λ, A ∧B
Π,Λ
cut
we replace it with
.... π1
Π, ¬A ,¬B
.... π
′
1
Λ, A
Π,Λ, ¬B
cut
.... π
′
2
Λ, B
Π,Λ
cut
This approach requires inversion lemmas. A typical case is: If π′ ⊢ Π,A ∧ B
then there is a π′1 ⊢ Π,A of cut rank and length ≤ that of π
′. In the proof of
the inversion lemma, one replaces all ancestors of A ∧B in π′ by A and “fixes”
those rules that are no longer valid. For instance, replace
....
Γ,A
....
Γ,B
Γ,A
∧R
by
....
Γ,A
But now consider a derivation π′ which contains the ε1 rule:5
....
Π,A ∧B(εx C(x)),¬C(εx C(x))
....
Π,C(t)
Π,A ∧B(εx C(x)
ε1
The inversion lemma produces
....
Π,A,¬C(εx C(x))
....
Π,C(t)
Π,A
ε1
This, again, no longer satisfies the condition of ε1 .
5 (A ∧B(εxC(x)) is ∆(εxC(x)) in this case).
Open Problem 49. Prove cut-elimination for the Mints-Yasuhara system, or
give a similarly simple sequent calculus for which it can be proved.
5.2 Natural deduction
In Gentzen’s classical natural deduction system NK, the quantifier rules are
given by
A(z)
∀xA(x)
∀I
∀xA(x)
A(t)
∀E
A(t)
∃xA(x)
∃I
∃xA(x)
[A(z)]
....
C
B
∃E
where z must not appear in any undischarged assumptions (nor in A(x) or B).
Meyer Viol [15] has proposed a system in which the ∃E rule is replaced by
∃xA(x)
A(εxA(x))
∃Eε
and the following term rule is added
A(t)
A(εxA(x))
Iε
Open Problem 50. Does Meyer Viol’s system have a normal form theorem?
Adding ∃Eε and Iε to the intuitionistic system NJ results in a system that
is not conservative over intuitionistic logic. For instance, Plato’s principle, the
formula
∃x(∃y A(y)→ A(x))
becomes derivable:
[∃y A(εxA(x))]
A(εxA(x))
∃Eε
∃y A(y)→ A(εxA(x))
→ I
∃x(∃y A(y)→ A(x))
∃I
However, the system also does not collapse to classical logic: it is conservative
for propositional formulas.
Intuitionistic natural deduction systems are especially intriguing, as Abadi,
Gonthier and Werner [1] have shown that a system of quantified propositional
intuitionistic logic with a choice operator εX can be given a Curry-Howard cor-
respondence via a type system which εX A(X) is a type such that the type A(X)
is inhabited. System E is paired with a simply typed λ-calculus that, in addition
to λ-abstraction and application, features implementation: 〈t : A with X = T 〉
of type A(ǫXA/X). If A(X) is a type specification of an interface with variable
type X , then A(T ) for some type T is an implementation of that interface.
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